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by Marco Lossani, Piergiovanna Natale and Patrizio Tirelli
0. Introduction
Following the seminal work of Barro - Gordon (1983), a number of pro-
posals have been put forward to correct the inflation bias. Some are inher-
ently sub-optimal, in the sense that lower inflation may be attained only if
distortionary stabilisation policies are implemented. Policy delegation to a
weight-conservative central banker à la Rogoff-Lohmann1 is the classical ex-
ample. The inflation bias is reduced and output variability increased to the
extent that the central bank is more inflation-averse than society and institu-
tional arrangements preserve its independence. More recently, advocates of
the principal-agent approach (Walsh, 1995; Persson - Tabellini, 1993) claim
that the trade-off between credibility and flexibility is probably overstated.
By means of a relatively simple performance-based contract, society can en-
tirely remove the inflation bias and yet avoid distortionary responses to
shocks. Instead of relying on the banker’s specific attitude towards inflation,
society itself can provide the right incentives for the banker to deliver low
inflation. The contractualist approach has renewed interest in the issue, and
has been subject to sharp criticisms as well. McCallum (1995) argues that if
the lack of commitment technology causes the inflation bias, performance-
based contracts simply relocate the time-inconsistency problem at a different
level, i.e. the contract credibility – or lack of it2. In fact, ex-post contract en-
Received February 2000, approved December 2000.
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1 See Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992).
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forcement cannot be taken for granted if the bank and the government share
the same view on the output-inflation trade-off and both regard equilibrium
output as inefficiently low. As pointed out in Waller (1995), contracts may
increase policy credibility relative to simple announcements only to the ex-
tent that renegotiation costs are sufficiently high.
If the pioneering work of Walsh set the stage for the contractualist re-
search agenda, Svensson’s inflation target (Svensson, 1995) is meant to
bridge the gap with the reality of monetary policy-making. While perfor-
mance-based contracts are seldom observed in practice, in several countries
central banks have endorsed inflation targets following the early failure of
money supply targets and the difficulties met with nominal exchange rate
pegs. Svensson shows that by an appropriate choice of the target, society can
replicate the outcome which would obtain under an optimal contract. Two
interpretations may be given of this result. If the central banker can be held
accountable, a target is a non-distortionary performance-based contract. Al-
ternatively, Svensson’s proposal may be interpreted as a suggestion that mon-
etary policy be delegated to a genuinely target-conservative central banker,
that is, a banker who implements non-distortionary responses to shocks but
prefers an expected inflation rate lower than the socially optimal one.
This paper explores the implications that either interpretation bears to
the working of the inflation target proposal, by means of a model where – as
in Alesina – Tabellini (1987) – distortionary taxes and seigniorage revenues
are needed to finance public expenditures. We follow a three-step strategy.
First, we compute the socially optimal inflation rate. Then, we derive the in-
flation bias, which arises as a consequence of discretionary monetary policies
when the supply function is adversely affected by tax distortions and labour
market imperfections. Finally, we focus on the two alternative interpretations
of the inflation targeting proposal, assuming that the government and the
central bank independently set their policy instruments, respectively the tax
and the inflation rate.
We show that the optimal contract is substantially different from the one
discussed in Svensson: either the inflation target is implausibly negative or a
linear penalty in inflation must be added to the contract3. Moreover, if the
commitment technology is imperfect, i.e. if the cost of reneging on the as-
signed target is small, any target so low to generate an ex-post loss in excess
of the renegotiation cost will lack credibility. It follows that only «highish»
inflation targets are credible. To make an impact on inflation expectations,
imperfectly credible targets must be inversely related to renegotiation costs.
We present a new perspective also on the alternative view, which regards
the inflation target proposal as a form of delegation to a target-conservative
central banker. In principle, the task of credibility-building should be easier.
Since the central banker has no incentive to ex-post collude with the govern-
3 For a criticism of negative inflation targets, see De Grauwe (1996).
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ment, all we need are sufficient legal guarantees of the central bank inde-
pendence. But why should a central banker be target-conservative? In our
model a target-conservative central banker à la Svensson is an expenditures-
conservative banker, that is, an agent or an institution whose public expendi-
tures target falls short of the socially optimal one. However, no more than an
idiosyncratic view about the benefits from public expenditures can be in-
voked to explain expenditures-conservatism, implying that target-conserva-
tive agents are also weight-conservative.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 1, we review
Svensson’s inflation targeting proposal. In section 2, we present a model of
the socially optimal inflation rate following a typical public finance approach.
In section 3, we define the optimal contract. In section 4, we discuss the
credibility issue. Section 5 shows that non-distortionary, target-conservative
central bankers must be expenditures-conservative agents. Section 6 con-
cludes.
1. The simple analytics of inflation targeting
In this section, we provide a brief overview of inflation targeting, as pro-
posed in Svensson (1995).
Consider an economy described by the following aggregate supply func-
tion:
(1)   y y
e= – + –( ) ˆ  ε
Output y – expressed in logarithms – depends on inflation surprises ( –
e), a term capturing distortions in the economy,   ˆy , and a shock ε, whose reali-
sations are independently distributed with zero mean and finite variance   ε
2 .
Observe that   Ey y= – ˆ , that is, expected output falls short of the socially opti-mal level, assumed to be zero. The private sector submits wage demands be-
fore observing the realisation of the supply shock and thus it has to form ex-
pectations about inflation. We assume inflation expectations are rational:
(2) E = e
where E is the expectations operator.
The government’s loss function is4:
(3)
  
L y kG = + –
1
2
2
1
2( ˜ ) [ ]
4 As customary in the literature on monetary policy delegation, the government’s loss
function reflects society’s preferences.
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where   ˜  defines the socially optimal inflation rate and it is assumed to be
positive. The government choice variable is the inflation rate, set after ob-
serving the realisation of the supply shock. Under rational expectations, it
would be optimal for the government to announce an inflation rate  equal
to   ˜ . As in equilibrium inflation expectations are correct, any other inflation
rate imposes a cost in terms of deviation from the socially optimal level with-
out generating output benefits. However, absent a commitment technology,
such announcement is not credible. Inflation is set after expectations are
formed and hence the policymaker takes them as given, i.e. she ignores the
impact of her action on inflation expectations5. Thus, the policymaker’s loss
function is minimised at:
(4)
  

 D
ek
k
y
k
=
+
+
– +
+
1
1 11 1
˜ ( ˆ)ε
The private sector anticipates it and solving for rational expectations
yields:
(5)
  
 D
y
k k
= + –
+
˜
ˆ
1 11
ε
where the term 
  
yˆ
k1
 is the inflation bias.
From (5), it is apparent that inflation is systematically above the socially
optimal level. To curb inflation, monetary policy can be delegated to a cen-
tral banker whose loss function is by statute defined as follows:
(6)
  
L y kB b b= + –
1
2
2
1
2( ˜ ) [ ]
where   k
b
1  and   ˜ b  are selected by the policymaker to minimise her loss func-
tion (2). As the central banker implements:
(7)
  

 B
b b
b
e
b
k
k
y
k
=
+
+
– +
+
1
1 11 1
˜ ( ˆ)ε
5 Following the jargon, we say that the policymaker acts in a regime of full discretion.
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the policymaker finds it optimal to set   k k
b
1 1=  and 
  
˜ ˜
ˆ
 b
y
k
= –
1
, i.e. to assign
an explicit inflation target below the socially optimal inflation rate to a cen-
tral banker who shares the policymaker’s preferences over the output and in-
flation trade-off. The inflation bias is eliminated and the central bank imple-
ments the optimal monetary response to shocks, that is, complete output sta-
bilisation of random disturbances is achieved6. However, note that the infla-
tion targeting proposal has empirical relevance only if the socially optimal in-
flation rate is positive and sufficiently large relative to the inflation bias. Oth-
erwise, removal of the inflation bias would require the endorsement of a ne-
gative target, that is, the central bank should pursue – implausibly – syste-
matic deflation.
Svensson offers two interpretations of his result. Expressions (6) and (7)
can be seen as the reduced form of a model where the central bank is bound
by a performance-based contract à la Walsh7. The proposal may be also in-
terpreted as a suggestion that monetary policy be delegated to a genuinely
target-conservative central banker, that is, a banker who implements non-dis-
tortionary responses to shocks but prefers an expected inflation rate lower
than the socially optimal one. Thus, Svensson’s inflation targeting proposal is
meant as a bridge over the gap between the theory and the reality of mone-
tary policy making. In the following, we argue that this is not the case. In
particular, we show that the proposed interpretations of inflation targeting
make sense only if monetary policy is modelled in isolation from fiscal poli-
cy. But this can hardly be done. In fact, alongside with labour market imper-
fections (Svensson, 1995), distortionary taxation is likely to be at the root of
the inflation bias (Alesina - Tabellini, 1987). If deviation of output from the
socially optimal level are assumed to reflect labour market imperfections, u,
as well as distortionary taxation,    : yˆ u= + , fiscal and monetary policiesmust be jointly determined. We carry out this task in the next section. As it
will be clear soon, this modelling strategy allows us to endogeneise the posi-
tive socially optimal inflation rate, which Svensson (1995) only postulates.
6 The inflation bias can be eliminated also by delegating monetary policy to a weight-
conservative central banker –   k k
b
1 1<  – who shares the policymaker’s inflation target   ˜
(Rogoff, 1985; Lohmann, 1992). Still, this arrangement entails incomplete output stabilisation
and thus it can not be preferred to inflation targeting, on welfare grounds.
7 The contract would take the form 
  
W
k
k wb b= – –1 2 1
2
( ˜ ) ˜  , where   ˜b  is an explicit
inflation target and w ensures that the central banker’s participation constraint is satisfied.
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2. A model of the socially optimal inflation rate
Consider an economy described by the aggregate supply function (1),
where   ˆy u= + . In this economy, the government provides a certain amount
g of public goods8, to be financed by means of distortionary taxes, , and
seigniorage revenues proportional to inflation, k0 (0 < k0 ≤ 1)9:
(8) g = t + k0
Equation (8) approximately holds if money demand, specified according
to a quantity theory, is independent of fiscal policy and g is defined as a
fraction of nominal income10. The government’s loss function is:
(9)
  
L y k k g gG = + + –
1
2
2
1
2
2
2 ( ˜ )[ ]
where   ˜g  defines the government expenditures target.
The first step in our analysis is the determination of the optimal inflation
and tax rates, that is, the rates which would obtain if the government were
able to commit. Next, we examine a regime of policy discretion.
2.1. Commitment
Following Svensson (1995), the optimal inflation rate is obtained mini-
mising (9) with respect to , e11 and  under the constraints (1), (2) and
(8). The first-order conditions are:
(10a)   y k k g g k+ + – + =1 2 0 0 ( ˜ )
(10b) – E(y) –  = 0
(10c)   – + – =y k g g2 0( ˜)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the rational expectations constraint.
8 Alternatively, g could be interpreted as public expenditures inclusive of service on out-
standing public debt. None of the results would be affected.
9 To simplify the analysis, we follow Alesina - Tabellini (1987) in ruling out the possibili-
ty that public expenditures be financed issuing debt. The implications of debt accumulation
are discussed in a companion paper (Lossani - Natale - Tirelli, 1998).
10 This is shown in Alesina - Tabellini (1987, p. 622).
11 By so doing, the policymaker takes into account the effects of her policy action on in-
flation expectations.
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Combining (1), (2), (8) and equations (10a), (10b) and (10c), we obtain
the solutions for the optimal inflation, taxes and public expenditures:
(11a)
  
C
k k k u g
k k k k
k k k
k k k k
=
/ +
+ + /
–
+ /
+ + + ) /
0 2 1
2 0
2
2 1
0 2 1
2 0
2
2 11
1
1 1
( )( ˜)
( )
( )( )
( ( )
ε
(11b)
  
C
k k k u k g
k k k k
k k k k
k k k k
= –
+ / –
+ + /
+
+ + /
+ + + ) /
[ ( )] ˜
( )
( )( )
( ( )
1
1
1 1
1 1
0
2
2 1 1
2 0
2
2 1
0 0 2 1
2 0
2
2 1
ε
(11c)
  
( ˜ )
( ˜ )
( ) ( ) ( )
g g
u g
k k k k k k k k
C – = –
+
+ + /
+
+ + + /1 1 12 02 2 1 2 0 2 2 1
ε
Inspection of (11a) reveals that the socially optimal inflation rate can be
positive, as postulated in Svensson (1995). This occurs when a seigniorage
tax is available, i.e. k0 > 0. As taxes  are distortionary, the policymaker is
willing to bear some inflation in order to reduce them and meet the budget
(Phelps, 1973; Mankiw, 1987)12. In this vein, a number of recent papers
(Beetsma - Bovenberg, 1998, 1999; Leith - Wren-Lewis, 2000; Poutineau-Ha-
miache, 2000) analyse the working of EMU fiscal and monetary policies un-
der the assumption of positive seigniorage revenues. As a matter of fact, sei-
gniorage is not the only reason why society may opt for a second-best posi-
tive equilibrium inflation rate. One might consider the potential effect of in-
flation on output through the Tobin-Mundell effect on the real interest rate13
or the role played by inflation in removing nominal rigidities (Akerlof -
Dickens - Perry, 1996). Still, empirical evidence suggests that even in the re-
cent past, governments have relied heavily on seigniorage revenues. Click
(1998, p. 155) reports that in a sample of up to ninety countries, including
most OCDE members, over the period 1971-1990 seigniorage on average
amounts to 2.5% of GDP and finances 10.5% of government spending. Using
data from a sample of sixty-two countries over the period 1973-1994, Cam-
pillo - Miron (1996) show that optimal tax considerations are an important
determinant of inflation rates.
12 Chari - Christiano - Kehoe (1996) show that the Phelps result need not to apply to a
number of specifications for the agents’ utility functions. On the deciding over the relevance
of the seigniorage motive to inflation, we find the empirical evidence discussed below
compelling.
13 However, the sign of the latter, traditionally expected to be positive, is reversed in
plausible models (Stockman, 1981; Sweeney, 1987).
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Finally, expression (11a) shows that the socially optimal inflation rate is
negatively related to ε and is affected by the weight attached to the output-
inflation trade-off. Instead, taxes and public expenditures are positively relat-
ed to ε. Adverse supply shocks raise the marginal cost of taxes, thus govern-
ments are less willing to finance expenditures. Note that our framework suc-
ceeds in integrating two issues usually treated as logically distinct14, that is,
the determination of the optimal tax mix and the analysis of stabilisation
policies.
2.2. Discretion
We now turn to the analysis of monetary and fiscal policies in case of full
discretion, i.e. when the government optimises taking inflation expectations
as given. The government minimises loss function (9) with respect to  and
, but not e, under the constraints (1), (2) and (8). The following first-order
conditions obtain:
(12a)   y k k g g k+ + – =1 2 0 0 ( ˜ )
(12b)   – + – =y k g g2 0( ˜)
Combining (1), (2), (8) and equations (12a) and (12b), the solutions for
inflation, tax rate and public expenditures are:
(13a)    
D C k k k u g= + / + + –( )( )( ˜)2 1 2 11 K
(13b)    
D C k k k k u g= – / + –[ ( )]( ˜)0 2 2 1 1K
(13c)   ( ˜ ) ( ˜ ) ( )( ˜ )g g g g k k k u g
D C– = – + / + –0 2 1 1K
where K =   [ ( )][ ( )( )]1 1 11 0
2
2 1 2 0 0 2 1+ + / + + + /k k k k k k k k k .
Relative to the commitment solutions, inflation and public expenditures
increase whereas taxes and output distortions fall. In this set-up, the govern-
ment uses monetary policy to correct for fiscal distortions and under rational
expectations, this gives rise to a positive inflation bias, the second addendum
14 See for instance Alesina - Tabellini (1987), Van der Ploeg (1995) and Svensson (1995).
379
in (13a). The inflation bias is decreasing in the seigniorage tax, as a large k0
increases revenues for any inflation rate and thus reduce the need for distor-
tionary taxes15.
Equipped with these results, we are able to analyse the working of an in-
flation targeting regime.
3. Inflation targets as credible contracts
Suppose the government delegates monetary policy to a central banker
who shares the government’s loss function (9)16, but is bound by contract W.
The central banker’s loss function becomes:
(14)
  
L y k k g g WB = + + – +
1
2
2
1
2
2
2[ ( ˜) ]
where
(15)
  
W
k
k wb b= – + –1 2 1
2
( ˜ ) ˜  
Contract W entails an explicit inflation target – b – plus a penalty in in-
flation – 17 – while w ensures that the central banker’s participation con-
straint is satisfied. Thus, the loss function (14) can be written as18:
15 To put it differently, the above result and all that follows from it – in particular C.1
and C.2 – are robust to a model specification where seigniorage is absent.
16 This is in keeping with the literature on inflation targeting which postulates that the
central bank is just a branch of government (Persson - Tabellini, 1993). Moreover, it allows to
separate the effects of a performance-based contract from those of special features of the cen-
tral banker’s loss function.
17 Such penalty is deemed superfluous in Svensson’s model. But, as it will be made clear
in a moment, this is an artifact of the exogenous specification of a positive socially optimal in-
flation rate.
18 A number of papers (Debelle, 1996; Debelle - Fischer, 1994; Beetsma - Bovenberg,
1995) define central bank’s independence as neglect for seigniorage revenues, i.e.
  
L y kB = +
1
2
2
1
2[ ]  , where  is a choice variable in institutional design. None of the results in
this and the following sections would change under the above specification, granted  = 1/
(1 + k0). See the appendix. Still, we object to the argument underlying the above specification.
In our view, independence is better defined as the set of legal provisions that limit the gov-
ernment’s ability to override the central bank’s decisions (Lohmann, 1992). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the issue, see section 3.
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(16)
  
L y k k g g wB b= + – + – ]+ –
1
2
2
1
2
2
2[ ( ˜ ) ( ˜ )  
In this framework, akin to Svensson (1995), the government and the cen-
tral bank simultaneously minimise (9) and (16) by setting the tax and the in-
flation rate, respectively. Imposing rational expectations, the solution to the
above game is:
(17a)
  
 
 
B D
bk k
k k k k k
= +
+ – /
+ + + /
( )( ˜ )
( )( )
1
1 1
2 1
2 0 0 2 1
(17b)
  
 
 
B D
bk k k
k k k k k
= –
– /
+ + + /
0 2 1
2 0 0 2 11 1
( ˜ )
( )( )
(17c)
  
( ˜ ( ˜ )
( ˜ )
( )( )
g g g g
k k
k k k k k
B D
b
– )= – +
– /
+ + + /
0 1
2 0 0 2 11 1
 
In setting the contract terms, the government aims at achieving the so-
cially optimal inflation rate. This is obtained by any pair (  ˜ b ; ), which sa-
tisfies:
(C.1)
  
˜
( )( ˜ )
( )
 b k
k k u g
k k k k
– / = –
/ +
+ + /2
2 1
2 0
2
2 11
Relative to discretion, adoption of contract C.1 entails lower inflation, as
higher taxes and lower expenditures. It is easy to see that, absent the linear
penalty in inflation, the optimal inflation target is negative. Within this
framework, setting a non-negative inflation target is neither necessary nor
sufficient to reduce inflation expectations, whereas the linear penalty  is
necessary and sufficient if contract enforcement is credible. In fact, when ac-
companied by a suitably selected penalty, any target can deliver the socially
optimal inflation rate. This result holds because in the present model socie-
ty’s bliss point is at zero inflation, in contrast with Svensson (1995) where it
is achieved for a positive inflation rate. Absent non-distortionary taxes, a
positive inflation rate is optimal, but nonetheless costly for society.
Given the above results, one is tempted to ask: why to have a target
then? Targets, being visible, can act as a co-ordination device for expecta-
tions. From this viewpoint, it seems reasonable to select the contract terms
as specified in C.2:
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(C.2)
  
˜ ; *
( )( ˜)
( )
  b C
k k u g
k k k k
= =
+ +
+ + /
1 0
1 0
2
1 2
1
1
Contract C.2 specifies that the central banker targets the socially optimal
inflation rate, so that systematic deflation is no longer an issue. Moreover,
the central banker is penalised in the level of inflation. As one would expect,
the penalty is increasing in the incentive to inflate, namely the perceived
marginal benefit from inflation. From first-order conditions for the central
banker and policymaker optimisation problems19, the latter amounts to
  k k g g2 01( )( ˜)+ – . Substituting for the expected value of the expenditures gap
under commitment20, * as in (C.2) obtains.
4. Renegotiation costs and contract credibility
Let us now turn to the issue of credibility. Early empirical tests cast
doubts on the size of credibility gains following the adoption of inflation tar-
gets. Svensson’s (1993) tests of inflation target credibility are inconclusive for
Canada, reject the credibility hypothesis for New Zealand in the early days
of the new arrangement – but not later on – and again reject it for Sweden.
Almeida – Goodhart (1998) are unable to find a statistically significant dif-
ference between countries, which adopted inflation targets, and countries,
which opted for alternative disinflationary strategies. They conclude that the
case for inflation targets is unproven. In the face of the observed imperfect
credibility of inflation targets, Svensson states that: Nevertheless, if the infla-
tion target is sufficiently low, the resulting inflation may be lower than it
would have been without the target (Svensson, 1995). In our view, this argu-
ment is misleading, as it postulates that an inflation target – or a contract –
per se may determine expectations, whereas it is the size of renegotiation
costs that ultimately generates the credibility of the regime. In this section
we present a formal discussion of this issue.
The incentives to ex-post renegotiate the contract are obvious. To the ex-
tent that inflation expectations attach credibility to the target, ex-post both
the government and the central banker are made worse off by any monetary
stance more «conservative» than the one which would be implemented un-
der discretion21. In fact, for any pair (  ˜ b ; ) and across shocks, the loss from
19 They are not stated as akin to (12a) and (12b).
20 See expression (11a).
21 Al-Nowaihi - Levine (1996) identify other reasons to support the view that Walsh con-
tracts are not renegotiation-proof. The first is that the distortionary taxes needed to finance
the bank generate adverse selection problems. The second is moral hazard and arises when
the bank is risk-averse.
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sticking to one’s commitment [LG( = B)] exceeds the loss from tearing up
the existing contract and running monetary policy as under discretion
[LG()]22:
LG( = B) – LG() =
(18)
  
1
2
1 1 1
1 12 2 0
2
1 2
1
2 0
2
2 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ˜
( ) ( )
+ + + +
– /
+ + + /
k k k k k
k
k k k k
b
[ ] 





 
Therefore the contract is credible only if the government’s decision to re-
negotiate is costly. Lohmann (1992) presents an exhaustive analysis of the
link between the size of renegotiation costs and the credibility of monetary
policy delegation schemes, treating renegotiation costs as a control variable
for the government together with the central bank degree of weight-conser-
vatism. In her model, this assumption is justified because the central bank-
er’s conservatism generates a conflict of interests in the conduct of monetary
policy. Hence central bank independence can be graduated – as in fact it is
number of countries (Grilli - Masciandaro - Tabellini, 1991) – to obtain the
optimal combination of commitment and flexibility.
In the contractualist framework, the bank and the government hold iden-
tical views on the benefits from ex-post surprises. Thus, legal arrangements
aiming to preserve the bank independence cannot prevent collusive beha-
viour, unless either the bank or the government, or both, incur some other
cost in reneging on the contract. Such cost may in fact be linked to reputa-
tional factors and «ego-rents» if inflation targets provide a highly visible
benchmark to assess the consistency of the policy stance (Persson – Tabel-
lini, 1993). Cukierman (1992) emphasises the role of policy announcement,
showing that institutional adherence to precision in monetary announce-
ments exerts a moderating influence on monetary activism. This may explain
why countries, which recently endorsed monetary targets, attempted to in-
crease the transparency of monetary policy decisions. For instance, in New
Zealand the Reserve Bank Act creates an institutional environment, which
compels the bank to publicly state in advance its intended policy action, and
to motivate subsequent revisions. Similar procedures have been followed in
the UK (Haldane, 1995) and are presently invoked for the ECB (Buiter,
1999). Al-Nowaihi - Levine (1994) redefine the time-inconsistency issue in
terms of a signal-extraction problem for the private sector, who is unable to
observe shocks and to correctly interpret the monetary stance. They show
that Walsh contracts may alleviate such informative inefficiencies by making
monetary policy more open and accountable. As a result, reputational equi-
22 Remember that the government and the central banker share the same loss function
net of contract W.
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libria may be sustained at least for a non-negligible time-span. However,
their conclusion is open to standard criticisms concerning the difficulties
with models based on reputation building, that is, the requirement of long
horizons and the possibility of multiple equilibria (Persson – Tabellini,
1990). All in all, although Walsh contracts probably increase the cost of
monetary surprises, it seems unlikely that institutional design is able to raise
renegotiation costs at will. Indeed, if simple policy announcements provided
an adequate commitment technology, time inconsistency would hardly be an
issue in monetary policy games23. Therefore, following Lohmann (1992), we
posit that the government’s decision to renegotiate the contract entails an ex-
ogenous cost, c > 0. We assume the following sequence of events:
Under these circumstances a government would stick to its commitments
only if:
(19) LG( = B) – LG() ≤ c
This sets a lower bound on the inflation target and the penalty that the
government can credibly assign to the central banker. It is easy to see that
across shocks, (19) holds in the form of identity for:
(20)
  
 = –
+
+ + + ) /
D c k
k k k k
2 1
1 1
2
2 0
2
2 1
1
2( )
( ( )






Thus, the contract (  ˜ b = C; *) defined in (C.2) is credible and attains
the goal of removing entirely the inflation bias only if:
(21)
  
c
k k k k u g
k k k k k k k k
c≥ ≡2 2 2 1
2
2 0
2
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Absent appropriate renegotiation costs, i.e. for any c < c, the best feasible
contract is the pair (  ˜ b ; ) that solves
(22)
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23 Jensen (1997) correctly points out that if the government could choose the costs of its
actions, delegations would not be necessary.
the contract wage setters ε hits the contract  is
is determined form expectations the economy is reconsidered selected
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From inspection of (13a), we see that only the negative root is an admis-
sible solution. Thus, the best feasible contract is:
(C.3)
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For c < c, the R.H.S of (C.3) exceeds the R.H.S of (C.1). This proves the
fallacy in Svensson’s argument that by suitably lowering the target the gov-
ernment can compensate for the apparent lack of credibility. In fact, it is
only when an adequate commitment technology is available that sufficiently
low targets may be credibly implemented.
Jensen (1997) addresses the issue of credible delegation arrangements by
postulating that renegotiation costs are proportional to the discrepancy be-
tween the existing contract and the newly agreed one. Under this assump-
tion, the optimal contract specifies a penalty in inflation, which falls as rene-
gotiation costs increase. Moreover, the optimal ex-ante contract is always re-
negotiated. Which cost specification is more appropriate is ultimately an em-
pirical matter and we share Jensen’s pessimism about the viability of contrac-
tual schemes. On the other hand, we are sceptical that – as suggested by
Jensen – the same degree of pessimism should be applied to other arrange-
ments where a conflict interest does persist between government and the
central bank, as it is the case for weight-conservative central bankers à la
Rogoff. As pointed out in Waller (1995), the tension between the conserva-
tive banker and the government wipes out the scope for collusive behaviour.
Thus, it should be possible to increase the credibility of a weight-conserva-
tive central banker by setting an appropriate system of checks and balances
and the procedures for resolving conflicts between the two institutions, as
discussed for instance in Lohmann (1994). However, output distortions
would unambiguously remain. From this point of view, the alternative inter-
pretation of the Svensson’s proposal has the merit of raising an important
point: to escape from the commitment versus flexibility dilemma, society
should be able to find a target-conservative central banker who is not
weight-conservative. In the next section we explore this issue.
5. Can central bankers be expenditures-conservative?
As mentioned in section 1, the inflation targeting proposal has been in-
terpreted also as delegation of monetary policy to a genuinely target-conserv-
ative central banker, that is, a banker who implements non-distortionary re-
sponses to shocks but prefers an expected inflation rate lower than the so-
cially optimal one. However, when the inflation bias has a fiscal root, the
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central banker preferred inflation rate can be negative. Under these circum-
stances, the proposal is devoid of empirical relevance.
The central banker’s preferences may still have a role to play if we do
not restrict our attention to the most preferred inflation rate. As selected
within society, central bankers are likely to have preferences over public ex-
penditures which reflect those of their constituencies. To take this element
into account, suppose that monetary policy is delegated to a central banker
whose loss function is characterised as follows:
(23)
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2
2
1
2
2
2[ ( ˜ ) ]
We assume that the government and the central bank – having observed
expectations – play non-co-operatively. The government minimises (9) with
respect to , taking  as given, and the central banker does just the opposite
in order to minimise (23). Policy variables take the following values:
(24a)
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expected inflation, taxes and public expenditures correspond to the socially
optimal levels. Moreover, stabilisation policy is carried out as under discre-
tion and no output cost is incurred. Delegation of monetary policy to an ex-
penditure-conservative central banker offers an other advantage. The socially
optimal inflation rate is achieved without announcing an explicit inflation
target, which is systematically missed.
However, a close inspection of G.1 provides firmer ground to the criti-
cism that targets have little or no empirical relevance. In our framework, the
relative degree of expenditures conservatism required to a central banker, i.e.
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  ˜ ˜g g
b– , increases in the labour market imperfections as well as in the govern-
ment expenditures target. Likewise, when little weight is attached to devia-
tions of public expenditures from target24,   ˜ ˜g g
b–  increases. Thus, negative
values for   ˜g
b  can not be ruled out. Indeed, this is the case when the scope
for seigniorage is very small, k0  0. It follows that, absent the seigniorage
motive, expenditures conservatism ceases to be an option for institutional de-
sign.
Adding to these difficulties, observe that the literature on monetary poli-
cy delegation does not provide any insight on how to select an expenditures-
conservative central banker. The weight-conservative banker à la Rogoff-Lo-
hmann was easily labelled as a member of the financial community, whose
sectoral interests are clearly identifiable on the grounds of economic theory
(Posen, 1993). In our case the task of selecting the central banker’s prefer-
ences is more complex as the constraints on her preferences are tighter.
Lindbeck (1985) identifies three main forces, which determine the level of
public spending: efficiency-driven motivations, the ability of pressure groups
to influence political decisions and «welfare altruism». It seems natural to
rule out the first motivation, as it is difficult to explain why an agent should
be opposed to the provision of public goods. Turning to the second one, the
public choice school (Buchanan - Tullock, 1962; Musgrave, 1985) posits that
– whatever the ideological preferences of the incumbent government – the
political decision-making process is biased towards excessive budget growth,
which does not entirely reflect the preferences of the public. High inflation
should be interpreted as a by-product of political distortions. In our model,
an inflation bias arises absent political distortions. Thus, simply assigning
monetary policy to an unelected official would not eliminate the bias. We are
left with the third motive. Partisan models suggest that expenditures-con-
servatism is usually correlated with stronger aversion to inflation. Hibbs
(1987) and Tabellini - La Via (1989) document partisan influences in the US
budget deficit, just as Alesina (1988) and Alesina - Roubini (1992) argue that
left-wing parties are less inflation-averse than their ideological rivals are. It
seems likely that a partisan expenditures-conservative banker is also a
weight-conservative one, thus resurrecting the familiar output versus inflation
trade-off25.
24 That is, k2 is small.
25 This result has some bearing also on the Alesina and Summers (Alesina – Summers,
1993) puzzle, according to which conservative central bankers à la Rogoff-Lohmann have
achieved low inflation with no adverse effects on output volatility. If weight-conservatism is
inherently linked to target-conservatism, and constituencies are aware of it, central bankers
exhibiting a moderate degree of weight conservatism are likely to be preferred to more hawk-
ish ones.
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6. Conclusions
This paper raises two points. First, we show that an inflation target à la
Svensson fails to mimic a Walsh contract when the optimal inflation rate is
endogenous. Under these circumstances, either the inflation target is negative
or it must be supplemented with a linear penalty in inflation. Second, we are
concerned with the credibility of monetary arrangements: setting a contract
between the government and a central banker, who share the same prefer-
ences over the policy outcomes, may increase the cost of monetary surprises,
but it is unlikely to remove the inflation bias. Credibility requires a genuine
conflict of interests between the central banker and her principal. When in-
flation has a fiscal root, such a conflict could arise if the appointed central
banker were expenditures-conservative, rather than weight-conservative à la
Rogoff-Lohmann. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to work. As we show, under
a number of circumstances delegation of monetary policy requires the ap-
pointment of a an extremely expenditures-conservative central banker. More-
over, the empirical literature suggests that weight conservatism and expendi-
ture conservatism are positively correlated features, thus resurrecting the fa-
miliar commitment versus flexibility trade-off.
Appendix
Suppose the government delegates monetary policy to a central banker
whose loss function is:
(A.1)
  
L y k WB = [ + ]+
1
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2
1
2 
where
(A.2)
  
W
k
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Thus, the loss function (A.1) can be written as:
(A.3)
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The government and the central bank simultaneously minimise their loss
functions (9) and (A.1) by setting the tax and the inflation rate, respectively.
Imposing rational expectations, the solution to the above game is:
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The policymaker selects the parameters   ˜ b,  and  to achieve the so-
cially optimal inflation rate. If  = 1/(1 + k0), the central banker’s response to
shocks is optimal, that is, the last addendum in (A.4a) coincides with the last
addendum in (11a). Thus, * = 1/(1 + k0). Given *, the inflation bias is
eliminated by any pair (  ˜ b; ), which satisfies:
(C.1.A)
  
˜ *
( )( ˜)
( )
  b k
k k u g
k k k k
– / = –
/ +
+ + /1
2 1
2 0
2
2 11
Absent the linear penalty in inflation, the optimal inflation target is nega-
tive. Moreover, if the policymaker assigns to the central banker an inflation
target   ˜ b = C, the optimal penalty in inflation is:
(A.5)
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We turn now to the issue of credibility. The government would stick to
its commitments only if:
(A.6) LG( = B) – LG() ≤ c
For   ˜ b = C,  = ** and  = *, the central banker’s policy delivers the
socially optimal inflation rate. Thus (A.6) holds only if:
(A.7)
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as in (21). Absent appropriate renegotiation costs, i.e. for any c < c, the best
feasible contract is the pair (  ˜ b ; ) that solves:
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From inspection of (13a), we see that only the negative root is an admis-
sible solution. Thus, the best feasible contract is:
(C.2.A.)
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As anticipated in the text, none of the results in section 2, 3 and 4 is af-
fected by the specification of the central banker’s loss function in (A.1).
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Summary: Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter? (J.E.L. E520, E580)
We reconsider Svensson’s inflation-targeting proposal in a model where the need to raise seigniorage
revenues determines the socially optimal inflation rate and distortionary taxes cause the inflation bias. In-
terpreting the targets as contracts, we show that the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy com-
plicates the structure of the optimal contract. Moreover, if the commitment technology is imperfect,
«highish» targets generate lower inflation than targets, which are too low to be credible. Alternatively, in-
terpreting inflation targets as policy delegation to a non-distortionary target-conservative agent, we show
that target-conservative bankers are public-expenditures conservative. Unfortunately, only idiosyncratic
views about the benefits from public expenditures can be invoked to justify expenditures-conservatism,
implying that target-conservative agents are also weight-conservative.
